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Abstract 
 
A suitable key agreement protocol plays an essential role in protecting the communications 
over open channels among users using Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP). This paper 
presents a robust and flexible password authenticated key agreement protocol with user 
anonymity for Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) used by VoIP communications. Security 
analysis demonstrates that our protocol enjoys many unique properties, such as user 
anonymity, no password table, session key agreement, mutual authentication, password 
updating freely and conveniently revoking lost smartcards etc. Furthermore, our protocol can 
resist the replay attack, the impersonation attack, the stolen-verifier attack, the man-in-middle 
attack, the Denning-Sacco attack, and the offline dictionary attack with or without smartcards. 
Finally, performance analysis shows that our protocol is more suitable for practical 
application in comparison with other related protocols.   
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1. Introduction 
  
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)-based communication systems are undergoing rapid 
development and attract a great deal of attention. Protection of personal communication 
information is one of the most important issues in VoIP communications over public channels. 
But the designers of VoIP communications systems mainly focus on a good level of quality of 
service and pay little attention to security problems. Due to these reasons, the voice packets 
transmitted between participants in VoIP communications are exposed to the unsecured 
Internet, which incurs various possible attacks. Long distance calling with Skype is one of the 
most popular applications of VoIP communications, and VoIP calls are more likely to be 
threatened by attacks compared with conventional telephone calls with public switched 
telephone network.  
With the widespread applications of VoIP, Session Initial Protocol (SIP) is receiving a lot 
of attention. SIP was proposed by Internet Engineering Task Force Network Working Group 
in 1999 [1]. Now, it is widely used as a text-based signalling protocol for VoIP. The 
architecture of SIP contains five main components: proxy server, redirect server, user agent, 
register server, and location server. 
Compared with other signalling protocols such as H.323, SIP is more flexible and 
lightweight. But the authentication of SIP is vulnerable to several types of security threats and 
attacks since it is inherited from HTTP Digest authentication. Most security requirements, 
such as confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and privacy, can be addressed by building an 
authentication key agreement protocol. In order to achieve a comparable level of network 
security with PSTN, an efficient authentication key agreement should be provided to realize 
the security requirements mentioned above.  
The security requirements of an authentication protocol for SIP can be summarized as 
follows: (1) Resistance to password guessing attacks, stolen-verifier attacks, and server-
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spoofing attacks; (2) Mutual authentication and session key agreement; (3) Providing user 
anonymity, i.e. the real identity of the user should be kept anonymity from any third party to 
protect the privacy of the user; (4) Security in updating passwords; (5) Perfect forward 
secrecy and known-key security; (6) Resistance to replay attacks, man-in-middle attacks, 
modification attacks and Denning-Sacco attacks; (7) Resistance to offline dictionary attacks 
with/without smartcards.  
Since original SIP authentication mechanisms could not protect privacy and valuable 
information over voice communications, several new authentication key agreement protocols 
have been proposed to provide strong security protection for prevalent VoIP services. As 
VoIP communication is more sensitive to transmission latency [2], providing a suitable key 
agreement protocol for SIP should not only meet security demands but also satisfy the 
requirement of transmission latency. The main objective of our study is to address these 
problems by constructing a robust and efficient authenticated key agreement protocol that 
provides strong security protection for SIP without sacrificing the quality of real-time VoIP 
communication. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes related work. 
Preliminaries are reviewed in Section 3. Section 4 presents our authenticated key agreement 
protocol. In Section 5, the security of our protocol is discussed in detail. The performance of 
the protocol is evaluated in Section 6, and the paper is concluded in Section 7. 
 
 
2. Related Work 
   
Developing a secure user authentication protocol is a critical issue in SIP-based 
communication services. To date, several protocols have been suggested to seek ways of 
strengthening the security of SIP authentication process. The original authentication protocol 
for SIP was based on hyper text transport protocol (HTTP) digest authentication, which offers 
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one-way authentication, but cannot support integrity and confidentiality protection. So the 
original authentication protocol was not good enough for providing acceptable security level in 
practice. 
Several authenticated key agreement protocols have been proposed in order to strengthen 
the security of SIP. In 2005, Yang [3] found that the original SIP authentication protocol 
incurred off-line password guessing attacks and server-spoofing attacks; they constructed a 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange-based SIP authentication scheme to solve the problems. But their 
protocol required the server storing a password table for verification purposes and involved 
expensive exponential computation which is not practical for SIP. Huang [4] later claimed that 
Yang’s protocol suffered two weaknesses when applied to SIP. One was vulnerable to off-line 
password-guessing attacks and the other was requiring the execution of expensive exponential 
operations. So Yang’s protocol was not suitable for low computational power devices. With 
these points in mind, Huang proposed a new authentication scheme for SIP. 
 Unfortunately, in [5] Jo discussed the cryptanalysis of Yang’s and Huang’s authentication 
protocols and demonstrated that both protocols were vulnerable to off-line password guessing 
attacks. To avoid the requirement of large Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), identity-based 
cryptography was employed by Ring [6] to construct an authenticated key agreement for SIP. 
Wang [7] found that Ring’s protocol suffered escrow key problems, and presented a 
certificateless cryptography-based key agreement protocol, but the computational cost was 
very high. 
In an attempt to improve efficiency, Wu [8] proposed an SIP authentication scheme based 
on Elliptic Curve Cryptograph (ECC) [19, 20] and proved its security formally by using 
Canetti-Krawczyk security model. Compared with previous schemes, Wu’s protocol was more 
efficient, but Liao argued that the distribution of shared secret keys in Wu’s protocol was a 
great obstacle to scaling up and the protocol failed to take system reparability into 
considerations [9]. To solve these problems, smartcards were employed to construct a 
password authenticated key agreement protocol for SIP by using a self-certified public key on 
elliptic curves. However, Liao’s protocol was susceptible to stolen smartcard attacks. Ni [10] 
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indicated that there was scaling up problems associated with Wu’s protocol, and proposed an 
identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol under Canetti-Krawczyk Model by using 
elliptic curve cryptography. Furthermore, Yoon [11] demonstrated that Wu’s SIP 
authentication protocol could not resist off-line password guessing attacks, Denning-Sacco 
attacks and Stolen-verifier attacks; Yoon proposed an authentication scheme to improve the 
security and to exploit the key block size, speed and security. Unfortunately, both Pu [12] and 
Gokhroo [13] claimed that Yoon’s scheme was vulnerable to off-line password guessing 
attacks and replay attacks. In 2009, Tsai [14] suggested a nonce-based SIP authentication 
scheme by using only one-way hash function and exclusive-or operations, thus reducing 
computational costs efficiently. However, in [15] Yoon argued that Tsai’s scheme was 
vulnerable to off-line password guessing attacks, Denning-Sacco attacks and stolen-verifier 
attacks. In addition, Tsai’s scheme could not provide perfect forward secrecy, and they 
proposed a new scheme to overcome the weakness. In 2012, Xie [16] demonstrated that 
Yoon’s scheme [15] could not resist stolen-verifier attacks and off-line password guessing 
attacks. They also proposed an improved protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography to solve 
above security problems. Moreover, Arshad [17] also indicated some security problems of 
Tsai’s scheme. Besides the two attacks mentioned above, they claimed that Tsai’s scheme did 
not provide known-key secrecy and perfect forward secrecy. In order to eliminate such security 
flaws, they proposed a mutual authentication protocol for SIP based on elliptic curve discrete 
logarithm problem. Most recently, He [18] presented a cryptanalysis of Arshad’s protocol and 
found that Arshad’s protocol could not resist off-line password-guessing attacks too. Based on 
Arshad’s work, He suggested an improved mutual authentication protocol for SIP, which is 
immune to several possible attacks. 
Nevertheless, the aforementioned protocols have several weaknesses. First, these protocols 
require SIP server to store a password or verification table consisting of the passwords or 
hashed passwords of all registered users for verifying the validity of users, making these 
protocols suffer from some attacks such as password guessing attacks, stolen-verifier attacks 
and server-spoofing attacks. In addition, since the password or verification tables are usually 
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very large, maintaining these tables makes these solutions hard to scale up, and the reset 
password problem decreases its applicability for practical use. Second, the aforementioned 
protocols failed to address the privacy issue of individuality as the real identities of users are 
transmitted in plaintext, adversaries could using intercepted messages to launch some attacks. 
Third, the aforementioned protocols cannot provide password-updating functionality for users 
to change their password as requested. 
To attack the problems mentioned above, we propose a robust and flexible password 
authenticated key agreement with user anonymity for SIP in this study.  
 
 
3. Preliminaries 
 
We first introduce the basic concepts of the elliptic curve cryptosystem and associated 
difficult problems, then review original SIP authentication. 
 
3.1 Elliptic curve group and complexity problems 
In an elliptic curve cryptosystem, the elliptic curve equation is defined as the form of 
2 3( , ) : (mod )pE a b y x ax b p   over a prime finite field pF , where , pa b F and 
3 24 27 0(mod )a b p  . Given an integer *pt F and a point ( , )pP E a b , the scalar multiplication 
tP over ( , )pE a b can be computed as: ...tP P P P    (t times). 
Definition 1. Given two points P and Q over ( , )pE a b , the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm 
Problem (ECDLP) is to find an integer *pt F such that Q tP .  
Definition 2. Given three points P , sP and tP over ( , )pE a b for
*, ps t F , the Computational 
Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP) is to find the point stP over ( , )pE a b .  
Definition 3. Given two points P and Q sP tP  over ( , )pE a b for *, ps t F , the Elliptic Curve 
Factorization Problem (ECFP) is to find two points sP and tP over ( , )pE a b .  
 7 
 
Definition 4. Given two points P and sP over ( , )pE a b for
*
ps F , the Inverse Computational 
Diffie-Hellman Problem (ICDHP) is to find the point 1s P  over ( , )pE a b . 
We assume that the four problems above are intractable. That is, there is no polynomial 
time algorithm that can solve these problems with non-negligible probability. 
 
3.2 SIP authentication procedure 
  SIP authentication security depends on the challenge-response mechanism. The original 
SIP authentication protocol requires the user and the server pre-sharing a password beforehand 
[1]. This pre-shared password is used to verify the identity of the user or the server in the 
authentication procedure. The original procedure performs the following steps as shown in 
Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1 SIP authentication procedure 
 
 
4. Our Authenticated Key Agreement Scheme 
 
This section presents our newly designed SIP authentication key agreement protocol with 
user anonymity. In our protocol, there are two entities, the user’s smartcard and the server. 
Our protocol consists of five phases: system setup, registration, pre-computation, 
User      
Generate a nonce 
Compute RESPONSE    
( , , , )h nonce realm username response                         
Server
1.Step REQUEST  
2.Step ( , )CHALLENGE nonce realm  
3.Step ( , , , )RESPONSE nonce realm username response  
4.Step   Authentication: 
  compute ( , , , )h nonce realm username response  
and compare with RESPONSE 
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authentication and password changing. The notations used in this paper are summarized in 
Table 1.  
 
Table1. Notations and Terminology 
 
 
4.1. System setup phase 
In this phase, the user U and the SIP server S agree on some system parameters.  
1:StepS Server S first generates a large prime p and an elliptic curve equation ( , )pE a b with 
order n , which is defined in Section 3.1.  
2 :StepS S finds a generator point P with order n over ( , )pE a b , where n is a large number of 
security considerations. Then, S chooses a random integer *R ps Z as a secret key.  
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3 :StepS S constructs two secure one-way hash functions *( ) :{0,1} {0,1}kh   , 
* *
1 ( ) : {0,1} {0,1} {0,1}
kh G G     , where G is a cyclic addition group that is generated 
by P over ( , )pE a b .   
4 :StepS S keeps s  secret and publishes information 1{ ( , ), , ( ), ( )}pE a b P h h   . 
 
4.2. Registration phase 
When User U wants to register with SIP server S , it performs the following steps with 
S over a secure channel. 
1:StepR : ( ( ) ( ))U S h PW c h username c    
S first verifies U through a secure identification protocol. If U is eligible, it freely 
chooses its user name username , password PW and a random integer *R pc Z . Then U 
computes ( ) ( )h PW c h username c and submits it to S over a secure channel. 
2 :StepR  :S U Smartcard contains ( , )R T   
After receiving information from U, S computes two secrets 
2( ( ) ( ))R h PW c h username c s P  and ( ( ) ( ))sT E h PW c h username c  by using its 
secret key s  and the received message ( ) ( )h PW c h username c . Then S stores the 
secure information ( , )R T in the memory of U’s smartcard and issues it to U through a 
secure channel.  
3 :StepR   Smartcard contains ( , , )R T a  
Upon receiving the smartcard, U writes the secret message c to the memory of the 
smartcard. Then U’s smartcard contains ( , , )R T c . Finally, U keeps PW  and the 
smartcard secretly for authentication. 
For each user, the registration phase performs once.  
 
4.3. Pre-computation phase 
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The smartcard generates a random integer *1 R pr Z and computes 1W r R and 1r P . At the end, 
a three-tuple 1 1( , , )W r P r is stored into the smartcard. Furthermore, the three-tuple is moved 
from the smartcard after authentication. This means the three-tuples are different in each 
session. 
 
4.4. Authentication phase 
When user U wants to log into SIP server S , it must inserts its smartcard to a card reader 
and types its user name username and password PW . Moreover, the smartcard has to complete 
the pre-computation phase. Then the smartcard and the server cooperate to perform the 
following steps to authenticate each other as shown in Fig. 2. 
1:StepA  : ( , )U S REQUEST W V  
U computes 1( ( ) ( ))m h PW c h username c r P  by using its PW , username  and the 
secret message 1,c r  stored in the smartcard. It then uses m to encrypt 1r P  and 
T as 1( ( ) ( ) )mV E r P h PW c h username c T  . Next, it sends a request message 
( , )REQUEST W V to S over a public channel. 
2 :StepA  : ( , , , )sS U CHALLENGE realm Auth S r  
After receiving the request message, S computes ' 1 2( )m s W by using its secret 
key s . It then decrypts V to get 1 , ( ) ( )r P h PW c h usernamec and T by using 'm . Next, S 
uses its secret key s to decrypt the message T  and compares the value of the message 
( ) ( )h PW c h username c in T  with that of the ( ) ( )h PW c h username c inV . If they 
are not equivalent, S  rejects the user’s request message. Otherwise, S  chooses two 
random integers *2 R pr Z and *R pr Z , computes 2S r P  , 1 2K r r P , the session key 
1 1( ( ) ( ))SK h K r P r h PW c h username c   and 1 1( )sAuth h S r P r SK  by using the 
decrypted messages 1r P and ( ) ( )h PW c h username c . Finally, it sends 
( , , , )sCHALLENGE realm Auth S r to U over a public channel.  
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3 :StepA : ( , )uU S RESPONSE realm Auth  
After receiving the challenge message, U computes ' 1 1 2K r S r r P   
and ' '1 1( ( ) ( ))SK h K r P r h PW c h username c  . Then it verifies whether the 
following equation holds
?
'
1 1( )sAuth h S r P r SK . If held, it computes 
'
1 1( 1 )uAuth h S r P r SK  and sends ( , )uRESPONSE realm Auth to S over a public 
channel. Otherwise, it rejects the challenge message and terminates authentication. 
4 :StepA  After receiving the response message, S verifies whether
?
1 1( 1uAuth h S r P r   
)SK . If the message is authenticated, S sets SK as a shared session key with U ; 
otherwise, it rejects the response message and terminates authentication. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Authenticated key agreement phase 
 
4.5. Password changing phase 
 3. ' 1K r S , ' '1 1( ( ) ( ))SK h K r P r h PW c h username c    
 
?
'
1 1( )sAuth h S r P r SK  
  If the equation holds, '1 1( 1 )uAuth h S r P r SK   
User U  
1 1( , ( , , , , , ))PW Smartcard R T c W r P r  
( , )uRESPONSE realm Auth  
SIP Server 
( )s  
1. 1( ( ) ( ))m h PW c h username c r P    
1( ( ) ( ) )mV E r P h PW c h username c T   
'
'( ) , ( ) ( ) ( )smD V V D T h PW c h username c  
If they are equivalent, *2 ,R pr Z *R pr Z  
1 1( ( ) ( ))SK h K r P r h PW c h username c 
1 1( )sAuth h S r P r SK  
2S r P ,  1 2K r r P  
2. ' 1 2( )m s W   
Compare two values of ( ) ( )h PW c h username c  
( , , , )sCHALLENGE realm Auth S r  
4. Check ?
1 1( 1 )uAuth h S r P r SK   
( , )REQUEST W V  
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If userU wants to change its password, it needs to agree on a session key with Server S via 
the authentication phase in advance. The password-changing steps are executed as follows:  
1:StepP U  encrypts the new password message * **( ( ) ( ))h PW c h username c  by using the 
session key SK . Next, it sends * ** * *( ( ) ( ) ( ( )SKE h PW c h username c N h h PW c 
 
*( ) ))h username c N and N to S , where N  is a nonce for freshness checking. 
2 :StepP S decrypts the encryption message and verifies whether the authentication tag 
* * *( ( ) ( ) )h h PW c h username c N is valid. If not, it rejects the password changing 
requirement. Otherwise, it computes a new secret value * * *( ( ) (R h PW c h username   
* 2))c s P  and * * * *( ( ) ( ))sT E h PW c h username c  . It then sends * *( ( 1SKE R T h N   
* * ))R T toU . 
 3 :StepP  U decrypts the message and verifies whether the authentication tag * *( 1 )h N R T is 
valid. If so, U stores * * *( , , )R T c  in its smartcard. 
 
 
5. Security Analysis 
 
In this section, we discuss the security of our authentication key agreement protocol for SIP.  
 
5.1. Security properties 
The security properties that should be considered for SIP authentication protocols are 
Replay attacks, Man-in-the-middle attacks, Modification attacks, Denning-Sacco attacks, 
Stolen-verifier attacks, Offline dictionary attacks without smartcards, Offline dictionary 
attacks with smartcards, Session key security, Known-key security, Perfect forward secrecy, 
and Mutual authentication. 
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5.2. Security analysis 
Since the formal security proof of smartcard-based authentication key agreement protocols 
is still an open problem, all published related protocols have been demonstrated with a simple 
proof. In this section, we follow the approaches used by Wu [21] and He [18]. First, we 
discuss the security of our protocol by analyzing some possible attacks, and then evaluate the 
security of our protocol. 
 
Proposition 1. Our protocol can resist replay attacks. 
 
Proof. With the assumption that an adversary Bob intercepts the user 'U s  previous request 
message ( , )REQUEST W V  in 1StepA and replays it to the SIP server S  to impersonate the user 
U . However, Bob cannot construct a valid uAuth  and send it to the SIP server in 3StepA unless 
he can correctly guess the session key 'SK and 1r P . When Bob tries to guess the 'SK and 1r P  
from the intercepted message W , he still faces the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. 
Moreover, Bob cannot obtain 1r P and 
'SK by decrypting the intercepted messageV without the 
knowledge of secret key s and random integer 1r , where 1r  is a new integer chosen by the user 
U randomly in each new session. When Bob tries to guess the secret key s  and integer 1r  
fromW , he faces the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. So Bob cannot generate a 
valid uAuth  to pass the verification process of the SIP server in 4StepA .  
 On the other hand, suppose Bob intercepts the 
previous ( , , , )sCHALLENGE realm Auth S r message from the server in 2StepA  and replays it to 
impersonate the server S . The user U  will find out this attack by checking 
?
1 1( )sAuth h S r P r SK since 1r is assumed to be generated independently and different in each 
session. So, Bob cannot pass the verification process of the userU in 3StepA . In this case, no 
RESPONSE  message is sent back to Bob. Therefore, the replay attack cannot succeed in our 
protocol. 
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Proposition 2. Our protocol can resist man-in-the-middle attacks. 
 
Proof. In order to prevent man-in-middle attacks, the user U and the server S should 
authenticate each other, which require Our protocol to provide mutual authentication between 
them. In our protocol, the user U and the server S share a session key SK only after mutual 
authentication between them. So, an adversary Bob cannot make the independent connections 
with the userU  or the server S and relay messages between them, making them believe that 
they are communicating directly to each other over a private connection. Only if Bob passes 
the verification process of the server S , he can establish a session key SK with S , making the 
server S believe that it is talking to the user U . When Bob attempts to construct a valid 
authentication message to pass the verification process of the server S , he has to face the 
elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. On the other hand, for the same reason Bob cannot 
impersonate the server S to share a session key with the userU . Thus, Bob cannot launch the 
man-in-middle attack to cheat either the user U or the server S . 
 
Proposition 3. Our protocol can resist modification attacks. 
 
Proof. Suppose an adversary Bob intends to impersonate the user U , he modifies the 
REQUEST message by constructing ' ',V W and sends a fraud REQUEST message to the 
server S . After receiving the REQUEST message, the server decrypts the 'V by using its 
computed decryption key 'm . Since Bob does not know the secret key s , the server can find 
the attack by comparing the value of the message ( ) ( )h PW c h username c in T  with that of 
the ( ) ( )h PW c h username c  inV .  
Assuming an adversary Bob chooses ' '2 ,r r randomly and constructs an authentication 
message 'sAuth  to impersonate the server S and sends a 
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fraud ' ' '2( , , , )sCHALLENGE realm Auth r P r  to the user U . After receiving the 
CHALLENGE message, the user U  verifies whether the authentication message sAuth  is 
equivalent to its computed hash value ' ' '1 1( )h S r P r SK . Obviously, Bob cannot go through the 
verification process of the user U without the knowledge of password PW , 
username username , nonce c and secret message 1r P . 
If an adversary Bob attempts to impersonate the user U by modifying the 
'( , )uRESPONSE realm Auth  message and then sending to the server S , where 'uAuth is generated 
by Bob, for the same reason the server S can easily find the modification by checking 
?
'
1 1( 1 )uAuth h S r P r SK  . Therefore, our protocol can resist the modification attacks. 
 
Proposition 4. Our protocol can resist Denning-Sacco attacks. 
 
Proof. Suppose that an adversary Bob compromises an old session key SK  and attempts to 
find the user’s password or other session keys. In our protocol, the session key SK is 
constructed by 1 2K r r P , 1r P , r and ( ) ( )h PW c h username c ,where the random integers 
1 2,r r and r are different in each session process. When Bob tries to guess the user’s password 
PW  or other session keys from the compromised session key SK and other intercepted 
messages, he not only has to face the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, but also needs 
to break the hash functions, which cannot be solved with non-negligible probability. 
Therefore, our protocol can protect SIP against Denning-Sacco attacks. 
 
Proposition 5. Our protocol can resist stolen-verifier attacks. 
 
Proof. An adversary who steals the password-verifier from the server uses it directly to 
masquerade as a legitimate user in a user authentication process, which is called the stolen-
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verifier attack. Our protocol does not maintain any password or verification table on the 
server. Therefore, the protocol can resist the stolen-verifier attacks. 
 
Proposition 6. Our protocol can resist offline dictionary attacks without smartcards.  
 
Proof. Suppose an adversary Bob intends to carry out the offline dictionary attack, and 
through eavesdropping communications, Bob intercepts all messages relay between the user 
U  and the server S . In order to obtain the user’s password PW , Bob needs to extract 
( ) ( )h PW c h username c  from 21 ( ( ) ( ))W r h h PW c h username c s P  , which is equivalent to 
solving an instance of elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. So Bob cannot launch the 
offline dictionary attack by using the REQUEST message. Additionally, when Bob tries to 
derive PW from the information sAuth or uAuth , he faces the elliptic curve discrete logarithm 
problem. Therefore, our protocol can withstand against the offline dictionary attack without 
smartcards. 
 
Proposition 7. Our protocol can resist offline dictionary attacks with smartcards. 
 
Proof. Suppose an adversary Bob compromises the secret information ( , , )R T c stored in the 
smartcard of the user U  and intercepts the REQUEST  message, the CHALLENGE message 
and RESPONSE  message transmitted between the userU and the server S . Compared with the 
offline dictionary attack without smartcards, the addition information known by Bob in this 
attack is ( , , )R T c . However, Bob cannot extract ( ) ( )h PW c h username c  from R and check 
whether each of their guessed passwords is correct or not. Because computing 
( ) ( )h PW c h username c  from R is equivalent to solving an instance of elliptic curve discrete 
logarithm problem. Furthermore, Bob cannot obtain ( ) ( )h PW c h username c fromT without 
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the knowledge of the server’s secret key s . Therefore, our protocol can resist the offline 
dictionary attack with smartcards. 
 
Proposition 8. Our protocol can provide session key security. 
 
Proof. In our protocol, at the end of the key exchange, the session key 
1 1( ( ) ( ))SK h K r P r h PW c h username c  is not known by anyone but only the userU and the 
server S , since 1 2K r r P  and ( ) ( )h PW c h username c cannot be constructed correctly by the 
adversary Bob without the knowledge of 1( , , , )r c PW username or the secret key s and the 
random integer 2r . So, none of this session key 1 1( ( ) ( ))SK h K r P r h PW c h username c   is 
known to anybody but the user U and the server S . Therefore, our protocol provides session 
key security. 
 
Proposition 9. Our protocol can provide known-key security. 
 
Proof. In our protocol, the random numbers 1r and 2r  generated independently by the server 
S and the user 'U s  smartcard are different in each session process. So the session key 
1 1( ( ) ( ))SK h K r P r h PW c h username c  of each session is not connected with the session 
keys of any other sessions. Even if the adversary Bob compromises a session key SK and the 
random values 1r and 2r , he cannot compute other session 
keys ' ' ' '1 1 2 1( ( ) ( ))SK h r r P r P r h PW c h username c  . This is because in each session a fresh 
session key is generated depending on ' ' ' '1 2 1( , , )r r P r P r , and the secret differs in every session. 
Therefore, in our protocol, each run of the authentication and key agreement process produces 
a unique session key SK between the user U and the server S . 
 
Proposition 10. Our protocol can provide perfect forward secrecy. 
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Proof. In our protocol, suppose the user’s password PW  and the server’s secret key s are 
compromised. The adversary Bob may obtain the correct decryption key m by using the secret 
key s and the intercepted ( , )REQUEST W V message. He could then use m  to decrypt the 
message V  to get the secret information 1r P , ( ) ( )h PW c h username c and decrypt T to obtain 
( ) (h PW c h  )username c . But knowing above information is not enough for computing a 
previous session key ' ' ' '1 1 2 1( ( ) ( ))SK h r r P r P r h PW c h username c  , because Bob cannot 
compute a correct ' '1 2K r r P . In order to obtain K Bob needs to extract the 
value '2r from '2S r P or the value '1r from '1r P , which is equivalent to solving an instance of 
elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Therefore, in our protocol, even if the user’s 
password PW  and the server’s secret key s are compromised, the secrecy of previous session 
keys established by them cannot be affected. 
 
Proposition 11. Our protocol can provide mutual authentication. 
 
Proof. In our protocol, the server S and the user U  authenticate each other by checking 
uAuth  and sAuth , respectively. Therefore, our protocol can provide mutual authentication. 
 
Proposition 12. Our protocol can provide security in choosing and updating passwords. 
 
Proof. In our protocol, the legitimate user with smartcards can freely choose her or his 
favourite password in the registration phase. It makes users easy to remember their own 
passwords. Our protocol also provides an update password phase for users to change their 
password as requested. Even having been stolen or lost smartcards, any other person cannot 
change or update the password without knowing the current session key SK shared between 
the user U and the server S . 
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Proposition 13. Our protocol can provide user anonymity. 
 
Proof. In our protocol, the anonymity of the userU is obtained by hash function, symmetric 
encryption technique and elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. In the registration phase, 
the user name is protected by the password PW and a nonce c  chosen by the user. The hashed 
user’s identity consisting of the username username , the password PW and the nonce c is 
submitted to the server S . Even the server S  does not know the real username of the userU . 
In the authentication phase, the hashed username is protected by a secure symmetric 
encryption algorithm and elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. So, even if an adversary 
Bob compromises the secret ( , , )R T c stored in smartcards and record the used messages 
transmitted between the user U and the server S , he cannot derive the real username of the 
user without the knowledge of secret key s and user U’s password PW . 
 
 
6. Performance Comparison 
 
In this section, we first summarize the functionality of our protocol and then compare our 
protocol with relevant protocols in terms of computational cost.  
In our protocol, the user’s password is embedded in ( ) ( )h PW c h username c . In the 
registration phase, after receiving the secret message{ ( ) ( )}h PW c h username c , the server 
computes two secrets 2( ( ) ( ))R h PW c h username c s P  and ( ( ) ( ))sT E h PW c h username c  , 
the server stores the secrets in the memory of the user’s smartcard, and then delivers the 
smartcard to the user via a secure channel. Obviously, during the registration process, the 
server does not need to store any password table. Furthermore, in our protocol, the user’s real 
username is protected by hash function, symmetric encryption technique and elliptic curve 
discrete logarithm problem. The adversary cannot obtain the real username even if she or he 
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intercepts all the messages transmitted between the user and the server. Therefore, our 
protocol provides user anonymity to protect the user’s privacy. Finally, our protocol provides 
a secure updating password phase for users to change their password freely and can resist 
stolen smartcard attacks. As shown in Table 2, our protocol can provide more unique features 
such as no password or verifier table, user anonymity and password update freely, which has 
not been considered by other related protocols. In fact, these new features are very important 
in implementing a practical and universal authenticated key agreement for SIP-based VoIP 
communications. 
 
Table 2. Functionality comparisons between our protocol and others 
 
For the convenience of evaluating computational cost, several notations are defined: 
(1) ecsmT  is the time for executing a scalar multiplication operation of elliptic curve; 
(2) ecpaT  is the time for executing a point addition operation of elliptic curve; 
(3) hT  is the time for executing a one-way hash function; 
(4) invT  is the time for executing a modular inversion operation; 
(5) skeT  is the time for executing a symmetric key encryption operation; 
(6) skdT  is the time for executing a symmetric key decryption operation. 
Next, we discuss the implementation data. For the convenience of performance analysis, 
assume the AES cryptosystem is the symmetric encryption/decryption operation in our 
scheme. Duh [22] implemented AES based on MOTE-KIT 5040 (8-bit Atmel ATmega128L 8 
MHz). Their implementation encrypted and decrypted a 128-bit block of plaintext in 0.857 ms 
( skeT ) and 1.328 ms ( skdT ), respectively. Furthermore, based on PIV 3-GHZ processor with 
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512-MB memory and a Windows XP operation system, He [18] described the implementation 
of a scalar multiplication operation of elliptic curve in 12.08ms ( ecsmT ), and a point addition 
operation of elliptic curve less than 0.01ms ( ecpaT ) respectively (ECC group on Koblitz elliptic 
curve 2 3 2y x ax b    defined on 1632F  with 1a  and b a 163-bit random prime). They also 
showed that the processor could perform a modular inversion operation in 1.89 ms ( invT ) and a 
one-way hash function operation less than 0.001ms ( hT ). The execution times of related 
operations are summarized in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Execution times of related operations 
 
 
In the registration phase, our protocol requires two hash operations to compute 
( ) ( )h username c h PW c on the user side, one scalar multiplication operation of elliptic curve 
to obtain R and one symmetric key encryption operation to get T  on the server side. In the 
pre-computation phase, the smartcard takes two scalar multiplication operations of elliptic 
curve to obtainW and 1r P . In the authentication phase, the user takes two scalar multiplication 
operations of elliptic curve to compute 1( ( ) ( ))m h PW c h username c r P  and ' 1K r S ; two 
symmetric key encryption operations to compute V ; and five one-way hash function 
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operations to compute ( ), ( ), ,s uh username c h PW c Auth Auth and 
'SK . The server takes one 
scalar multiplication operation of elliptic curve and one modular inversion operation to get 'm ; 
two scalar multiplication operations of elliptic curve to compute S and K ; two symmetric key 
decryption operation to decrypt V  and T ; and three one-way hash function operations to 
compute , sSK Auth  and uAuth . In the password changing phase, the user takes four one-way 
hash function operations to compute 
* ** * * *( ), ( ), ( ( ) ( ) )h PW c h username c h h PW c h username c N
 
and * *( 1 )h N R T ; one 
symmetric key encryption operation and one symmetric key decryption operation. The server 
takes one scalar multiplication operation of elliptic curve to compute a new secret value *R ; 
two one-way hash function operations to compute * * *( ( ) ( ) )h h PW c h username c N  
and * *( 1 )h N R T ; and two symmetric key encryption operation and one symmetric key 
decryption operation. 
 
Table 4. Computational comparisons between our protocol and others 
Phase Yoon [15] Xie [16] Arshad [17] He [18] Our protocol 
Registration  2 1ecsm ecpaT T  1 skeT  N/A 2 hT  1 2 1ecsm h skeT T T   
24.17ms 0.875 ms  0.002 ms 12.975 ms 
Pre-
computation  
N/A N/A N/A N/A 2 ecsmT  
    24.16 ms 
Authentication  6 3 4escn ecpa hT T T   6 1 6
1 1 1
ecsm ecpa h
ske skd inv
T T T
T T T
 
    
5 6 1ecsm h invT T T   6 6ecsm hT T  5 8 1
2 1
ecsm h ske
skd inv
T T T
T T
 
   
72.52 ms 76.57 ms 62.30 ms 72.49 ms 65.82 ms 
Password 
changing 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 6
3 2
ecsm h
ske skd
T T
T T
 
  
    17.376 ms 
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Table 4 lists computational comparisons between our protocol and other related protocols. 
According to Tables 3 and 4, the authentication phase of our protocol is estimated to be 
implemented in 65.82 ms, the times for implementing the authentication phase of Yoon’s 
protocol [15], Xie’s protocol [16], Arshad’s protocol [17] and He’s protocol [18] are 72.52ms, 
76.57ms, 62.30 ms and 72.49 ms.  
Since Arshad’s protocol doesn’t provide registration, there is no computational cost for the 
registration phase. Unlike our protocol, other protocols don’t contain the Pre-computation and 
Password changing phases, thereby suffering from several attacks, so no computational costs 
are presented in Table 4 for these two phases. 
    In the pre-computation phase, since the integer r1 is chosen by smartcard instead of user, 
the message W=r1R and r1P are computed by smartcard at any time before the authentication 
phase. Although two scalar multiplication operations of elliptic curve are required in the pre-
computation phase, it would not affect the performance of the real-time VoIP communication 
since no data are transmitted during the pre-computation phase. Other protocols without 
smartcards cannot execute pre-computation, since users choose r1 differently during each 
authentication. So the performance is mainly dependent on the authentication phase. 
 
 
Fig. 3 Execution time comparisons between our protocol and others  
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As the authentication phase determines overall performance, execution time comparisons 
for authentication between our protocol and others are shown in Figure 3. Clearly our protocol 
is as efficient as Arshad’s, but is much efficient than the other three protocols (i.e. Yoon, Xie, 
He) in the authentication phase, this is because our protocol reduces the number of operations 
of scalar point multiplication of elliptic curve. 
The total computational overhead of our protocol costs little more, that is because our 
protocol possesses many unique features, such as not maintaining any password or 
verification table on the SIP server, users being able to choose or change its own password 
freely and providing user anonymity to keep user’s identity secret while still allowing the 
server to perform its own authentication, which requires more operations. Moreover, for each 
user the registration phase performs only once and the password change phase only performs 
when users need to update their passwords. Therefore, this minor computational increase is 
indispensable for constructing a reliable and trustworthy authenticated key agreement for SIP 
used by VoIP-based real-time communications systems. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
A new password authenticated key agreement protocol with user anonymity for SIP has 
been proposed in this paper. In our protocol, the user and the server can achieve mutual 
authentication and key agreement by using passwords and smartcards. Meanwhile, our 
protocol can withstand replay attacks, impersonation attacks, stolen-verifier attacks, man-in-
middle attacks, Denning-Sacco attacks and offline dictionary attacks with or without 
smartcard. In addition, our protocol also provides some unique features such as user 
anonymity, no password table needed, revoking lost smartcard conveniently and password 
updating freely. These new features have not been considered in other related work, but they 
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are very important to implementing a practical and universal authenticated key agreement for 
SIP. 
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